Policy Experimentation under Authoritarianism: The Politics of Labor Market Regulation in China.

China is widely praised for its gradualist approach to reform where almost every institutional change is experimented before implemented nationwide. However, few studies recognize that there are different patterns of experimentation. Through comparative studies on three sub-policies in the labor regulation regime, namely introducing labor contract system, promoting vocational training and drafting labor dispatch rules, I find that the labor policymaking can be categorized into three patterns: experimentation through local test sites or central provisional rules; local governments as the major policy initiator when there is no central guidance; and non-experimentation before a national law is passed. By examining the situation in two cities, Tianjin and Changsha, the paper identifies the causes of these various patterns. I find that the center makes use of preexisting local labor administrative agencies to reduce the risk of experimentation. However, the divergent interests of these agencies restrain the probability of success. I argue that the relationship between the central and local labor administrative agencies explains China's adoption of the different experimental strategies in reforming its labor market regulations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]