Territorial Disputes as Bargaining Leverage: Morocco v. Spain.

There are currently 62 enduring territorial disputes worldwide. The question is why so many disputes have not been settled. This paper proposes that many enduring territorial disputes can be explained by a theory of bargaining leverage. By persisting in territorial disputes, challenger states can pursue a strategy of issue linkage and compellence in order to achieve bargaining leverage in another disputed issue area. This dual strategy entails the challenger state first provoking the target state diplomatically or militarily regarding the territorial dispute, then threatening to take further action if the target state does not make a change regarding another disputed issue. In this way, the challenger state links the two issues, using the threat of action in the territorial dispute to compel the target state to change its behavior or policy in another disputed issue. I test the theory by examining the foreign policy strategies of Morocco in its territorial dispute with Spain over the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]