Structuring Chaos.

In this paper, we explore and develop various links between solution concepts such as the core, the uncovered set, and the Banks set, and the institutions of the United States Federal government. While significant advances were made in understanding the role of certain widely used legislative procedures (e.g. voting structure) in determining choices within a single majoritarian body (e.g. Shepsle & Weingast 1984a,1984b; Ordeshook & Schwartz 1986), very little work to date has applied these tools to the study of structures more frequently observed in judicial settings, supermajoritarian institutions, and multicameral settings. We use to theory to examine several examples -- across judicial, executive, and legislative settings -- of the theoretical principles in action, examining developments of the understanding of judicial review in the 20th century administrative state, modern legislative debates concerning the proper use of restrictive "majoritarian" procedures in both the U.S. House and Senate, and the rhetorical evolution of "equal protection arguments" in the national political discourse. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]