A HOBBESIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE RAWLSIAN DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE.

Much of the criticism of JOHN RAWLS', A Theory of Justice (1971), and especially that by economists, has concentrated on his difference or maximin principle of distribution, one of the two central principles of justice specifically suggested. This criticism is directed at the extreme risk-averseness that seems to be embodied in the maximin criterion. The maximization of expected utility is posed as a more plausible alternative. This paper offers an interpretation of RAWLs' argument that need not incorporate risk-averseness. The discussion involves a careful definition of the 'original position', which is not fully described by RAWLS. If the 'original position' is specifically defined to be the equilibrium that is attained in genuine Hobbesian anarchy (the war of each against all), the difference principle of distribution may emerge from the contractual negotiations of the parties as the only viable distributional rule. If, in this original, and highly undesirable, position, persons predict that any person, or small group, can reduce the whole society to anarchy by disruption, this difference principle may dominate the alternative that maximizes expected utility for the simple reason that the latter will be unsustainable. This interpretation indirectly explains RAWLS' relative neglect of enforcement of contractual provisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]