Applying Mainstream IR Theories to the International Criminal Court: The Case of Uganda and the Congo.

This paper focuses on various well-established theories of regime formation. In particular, it analyzes the main assumptions and parameters of realism, institutionalism, (and their offshoot theories of) legalization, and rational design by examining the role of rational utility, institutional design, consensus building through cooperation, the effects of rules and norms on state behavior, and the anarchical features of state non-cooperation. It then applies these theories to explain the parameters and implications of the recent cases referred to by the Ugandan and Congolese governments. As the relevance of these theories suggests, the ICC cannot escape the implications of power politics. Indeed, it is a global institution borne out of Realpolitik, but also capable of dealing with the effects of power politics though the implementation of its own rules, or by its own institutional design. Still, the purpose of the paper is not to advocate the transcendence of power politics, nor to defend the exclusive application of the above theories themselves, but simply to test their relevance against the recent ICC cases. Only through such an objective, the paper claims, can scholars accept or deny the relevance of these traditional theoretical perspectives. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]