British Learning Patterns toward Nazi Germany: Why Did Britain Persist with an Appeasement Strategy in the Face of Negative Feedback?

During the 1930s, British decision makers pursued a strategy of appeasement in dealing with Germany that culminated in the settlement of the Sudeten crisis at Munich in the fall of 1938. Following the Munich settlement, much of British elite and mass opinion shifted away from appeasement toward a deterrence strategy in dealing with Hitler. However, the Chamberlain Cabinet persisted in the pursuit of appeasment up to the outbreak of war in September, 1939. Why did Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax persist in the face of negative feedback, especially after Germany violated the Munich pact and occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939? In this paper we examine evidence of learning patterns in British public statements between 1937 and 1939, as these leaders addressed the German problem in a series of confrontations with Germany over the Austrian Anschluss, the Czech Sudeten crisis, the Prague Coup, and the Polish crisis over Danzig. We conclude that Chamberlain's belief system played a pivotal role in explaining why Britain persisted with an appeasement strategy in the face of negative feedback. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]