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Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space.
- Source :
-
International Journal of Game Theory . 2009, Vol. 38 Issue 2, p221-247. 27p. - Publication Year :
- 2009
-
Abstract
- The continuously stable strategy (CSS) concept, originally developed as an intuitive static condition to predict the dynamic stability of a monomorphic population, is shown to be closely related to classical game-theoretic dominance criteria when applied to continuous strategy spaces. Specifically, for symmetric and non symmetric two-player games, a CSS in the interior of the continuous strategy space is equivalent to neighborhood half-superiority which, for a symmetric game, is connected to the half-dominance and/or risk dominance concepts. For non symmetric games where both players have a one-dimensional continuous strategy space, an interior CSS is shown to be given by a local version of dominance solvability (called neighborhood dominance solvable). Finally, the CSS and half-superiority concepts are applied to points in the bargaining set of Nash bargaining problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00207276
- Volume :
- 38
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 40405176
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0148-z