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Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly “Lumpy” public goods
- Source :
-
Mathematical Social Sciences . Jul2009, Vol. 58 Issue 1, p98-109. 12p. - Publication Year :
- 2009
-
Abstract
- Abstract: We examine farsighted stable sets in a public good provision game where the public good is perfectly “lumpy” as defined by Taylor [Taylor, M., 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. In this case, Taylor argues that the game is not a prisoners’ dilemma game. While Suzuki and Muto [Suzuki, A., Muto, S., 2005. Farsighted stability in an -Person Prisoner’s dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 431–445] have shown that almost all outcomes included in a farsighted stable set of a prisoners’ dilemma game are Pareto efficient, we show in our game that almost all strictly individually rational outcomes are included in a farsighted stable set, including those that are not Pareto efficient. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
- Subjects :
- *PARETO analysis
*GAME theory
*PARETO principle
*PUBLIC goods
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 01654896
- Volume :
- 58
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 38803460
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.11.004