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The Means to Social Justice: Accounting for Functional Capabilities in the Rawlsian Approach.

Authors :
BLYTHE, MARK
Source :
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique. Dec2008, Vol. 41 Issue 4, p1003-1021. 19p.
Publication Year :
2008

Abstract

In developing his theory "Justice as Fairness," John Rawls imagined a hypothetical initial situation designed to yield principles of justice to regulate society's main institutions, or what he called the "basic structure." The positing of citizens as fully capable in this hypothetical "original position" allowed Rawls to consider advantage in terms of the primary social goods (all-purpose means) a citizen held. Rawls reasoned that the representatives of free and equal citizens would design principles of justice that yield equal liberties and "a fair equality of opportunity," while ensuring that permissible inequalities are those which "contribute effectively to the benefit of the least-advantaged" citizens (2001: 64). This essay considers two criticisms of the Rawlsian approach to distributive justice made by capability theorists (principally, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum). Sen's criticism is that primary social goods will not be equally usable by citizens because of variances in functional capabilities. Extending Sen's criticism, Nussbaum argues that disadvantaged citizens are not represented in the selection of the principles of justice, and this is problematic for a theory that emphasizes a fair equality of opportunity, especially for society's least advantaged members. This paper argues that the Rawlsian approach can successfully respond to and accommodate these concerns. The main ideas are as follows: (1) The representatives in "the original position" are to represent the known range of citizen capability rather than the normal range. (2) Rawls's two principles of justice would still be chosen, but these would be preceded by a lexically prior principle of basic citizen capabilities, which Rawls characterized as the "two moral powers" (rationality and reasonableness). (3) The desirability of other functional capabilities (those which enable persons to use primary social goods to realize their ends) and their development are to be publicly debated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00084239
Volume :
41
Issue :
4
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
35982033
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423908081146