The effects of non-negotiable domestic factors in Europeanization.

The bibliography on "uploading" European integration posits the bottom-up creation of a supranational body of institutions, rules and procedures by the members of the European Union (EU). In integration, the independent actors are the States and the EU is the dependant one. Recently, this path has been refined with an emerging attention on "downloading" Europeanization, the top-down domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating from EU membership. In Europeanization, the EU is assumed to be an autonomous actor, able to shape policies, polities and politics of its members.However, many studies suggest a spurious refraction between European integration and Europeanization. To this regard, my hypothesis is that when States fail to Europeanize in a particular area, they are providing a true input toward a new way to integrate that I call "un-adaptive integration". This failure happens because some non-negotiable domestic power, interests, norms and beliefs prevail.To validate my hypothesis I analyze two examples where non-negotiable domestic predominance causes failures in Europeanization and finally canalizes in un-adaptive integration. The first example is the German management of the Balkan crisis, where the pursuit of a non-negotiable "great power" foreign policy by its government nullified the task of any EU common foreign policy, not pursuing the goal to be a pacifier and democratic promoter. The second case is the French refusal to ratify the European constitution via popular referendum, demonstrating how non-negotiable societal vetoes can reverse the direction of the relationship in Europeanization, being the State the independent actor, not the EU. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]