As Parties Compete for Votes (By Buying Them): Gifts and Votes in Mexico.

This paper examines the effects of the exchange of particularistic benefits for political support in Mexico during the presidential elections in 2000, more specifically, it looks at the competition of the three larger parties to gain votes through the distribution of gifts and services. Competition though gift-giving sheds light not only on the strategies parties follow to buy votes but also on the ways in which such an incentive interacts with other dispositions. Therefore, three major questions drive this inquiry: what strategies did parties follow in distributing particularistic benefits? What electoral effects do these have? What role do voter attitudes, like partisanship, play in voting choices in the face of particularistic benefits? Through the use of post-electoral survey data, I provide evidence that parties in Mexico engaged in vote-buying effectively during the 2000 presidential elections, they successfully bid and bought votes. While these results are not surprising, this paper also presents evidence that PAN, the eventual winner, managed to successfully demobilize PRI voters, while PRI did the same but to a lesser extent. In this election major parties in Mexico competed with one another to hold old wards, to win back lost ones, and to reduce the share of voters for their competition. Although the electoral effects are small due to the relatively small number of recipients of gifts, they are statistically robust. Furthermore, evidence suggests the development of long-term relationships between parties and recipients of benefits that affect their partisanship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]