Ties That Do Not Bind: Why Treaty Ratification Might Imply Treaty Non-Compliance.

There is a general expectation that states will comply with the provisions set forthin treaties that they ratify. However, we know that a compliance gap exists and thatcountries sometimes do not fully incorporate or implement international treaties towhich they formally are party. We look inside the state to suggest a domestic politicsexplanation for these outcomes. Using a formal model, we find equilibria in whichstates will sign and ratify treaties but then either not incorporate them into domesticlegal codes or else implement them in a sub-standard fashion. The model suggests threebehaviors that can limit treaty implementation: buck-passing, hand-showing and thefear of compliance failure. We illustrate these behaviors with reference to case studiesinvolving the United States, India and Russia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]