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Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures.
- Source :
-
International Journal of Game Theory . 2008, Vol. 36 Issue 3/4, p409-420. 12p. - Publication Year :
- 2008
-
Abstract
- In any two-sided matching market, a stable matching can be found by a central agency using the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale and Shapley. But if the market is decentralized and information is incomplete then stability of the ensuing matching is not to be expected. Despite the prevalence of such matching situations, and the importance of stability, little theory exists concerning instability. We discuss various measures of instability and analyze how they interact with the structure of the underlying preferences. Our main result is that even the outcome of decentralized matching with incomplete information can be expected to be “almost stable” under reasonable assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00207276
- Volume :
- 36
- Issue :
- 3/4
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 30105485
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0081-6