The "New" Politics of Economic Reform: Working Out the Kinks in Mexico's Democratic Transition.

Mexico's 2000 transition to democracy seemed to signal the final demise of seven decades of single-party rule and the advent of truly competitive politics. At the same time, it appeared that the deep restructuring toward a market economy under the auspices of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was finally beginning to pay off in terms of growth, investment, and a slight upturn in distributional gains. However, the country's 2003 mid-term elections told a rather different story: the incumbent PAN party suffered a net loss in its congressional standings that was unprecedented for a Mexican party that controlled the executive office, while the former ruling PRI party not only gained in legislative presence but continues to play a prominent role in domestic politics. The tenacious political presence of the former architects of semi-authoritarian rule, as well as the country's weak legacy around democratic institution building, confirms that a decidedly gradual democratic transition will be even more protracted. This paper analyzes Mexico's transition from a political economy standpoint, with a focus on the need to reconcile the emergence of competitive politics with the development strategy now in place. We trace four main themes that have underpinned this transition over the past two decades, and then analyze the ways in which these themes have crystallized into the political economic challenges that faced the administration of President Vicente Fox. In essence, we argue that the current juncture constitutes a "new" political phase for carrying out the next wave of reforms, even if politicians and policymakers have been slow to grasp this reality and act accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]