NAFTA: Economic Statecraft?

In ?NAFTA. Economic Statecraft?? I attempt to determine whether the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) can be called a successful work of economic statecraft, as defined by James Baldwin in his book, Economic Statecraft. I hypothesize, first, that NAFTA can be defined as an act of economic statecraft. Second, I hypothesize that it has been a successful act of economic statecraft by both the United States and Mexico. After a brief literature review, I attempt to prove my first hypothesis. Baldwin defines ?economic statecraft? as an economic instrument which is used by one nation to influence other international actors. First, I demonstrate that NAFTA is an economic instrument. Second, I demonstrate that NAFTA is international in scope, involving at least three nations. Finally, I demonstrate that NAFTA was an attempt by both the US and Mexico to influence the behavior of the other. In addition, I suggest that NAFTA may have been used as a way to influence the behavior of stalling GATT (Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) trading partners during the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations. Next, I attempt to demonstrate that NAFTA was a successful influence attempt by both the United States and Mexico. I begin by comparing the costs and benefits of NAFTA, and attempting to determine whether the US and Mexico were successful in influencing the behavior of one another, and other world actors. Finally, I discuss possible alternatives to NAFTA, and compare the costs and benefits of NAFTA to the likely costs and benefits of those alternatives. Ultimately, I draw two conclusions. First, NAFTA can be called an act of economic statecraft. Second, NAFTA was successful as economic statecraft for two reasons: it was preferable to all other alternatives in terms of costs and benefits, and was successful in altering the behavior of other international actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]