Misunderestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs.

Many policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons; yet all rely on sound intelligence on the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States has had an uneven record of estimating weapons programs, overestimating the progress that some proliferators have made, while underestimating others. A comparative historical cataloging and evaluation of intelligence failures on nuclear weapons can therefore contribute major insights to public policy. This paper seeks to detail the circumstances and intelligence work surrounding sixteen of the twenty-five states that are thought to have attempted to develop nuclear weapons and derive conclusions about the political causes of distorted nuclear intelligence estimations. In particular, we evaluate specific hypotheses related to policy, culture, organizations, and institutions. We find that the US has overestimated much more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated states' programs, and that this is primarily due to policy-related causes, although cultural, organizational, and institutional biases also make significant contributions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]