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Allegedly impossible experiences.

Authors :
Jeppsson, Sofia
Source :
Philosophical Psychology. Jan2025, Vol. 38 Issue 1, p77-99. 23p.
Publication Year :
2025

Abstract

In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople's testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labeled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
09515089
Volume :
38
Issue :
1
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Philosophical Psychology
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
181986096
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2310628