Epistemic injustice in planning: a framework for identifying degrees of harm.

The primary objective of this paper is to nuance our understanding of how a knowledge-centred injustice can manifest in planning. To do so, the paper draws upon the concept of “epistemic injustice” from the field of social epistemology. Epistemic injustice occurs when certain voices are unjustly discredited and/or systemically marginalised. Recognising and addressing epistemic injustice is crucial as it can generate unjust harms in planning decision-making, as well as perpetuate institutionalised prejudice. The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of “epistemic injustice” by presenting a framework for identifying: (1) the conditions to be met for it to manifest; (2) how meeting different conditions generates different degrees of harm; and (3) detailing how meeting certain conditions may help to perpetuate institutionalised prejudice. The paper references a case of planning conflict in an informal settlement in Iran to illustrate the workings of this framework. The benefits and limitations of the framework are discussed. Suggestions for further research are identified. This paper contributes to the field by providing a framework for refining our theoretical understanding of epistemic injustice in planning and offering a practical illustration of the framework’s use in a context that is comparatively underrepresented in planning research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]