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Stationary Bayesian–Markov Equilibria in Bayesian Stochastic Games with Periodic Revelation.
- Source :
-
Games (20734336) . Oct2024, Vol. 15 Issue 5, p31. 17p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information revelation. In this environment, I show that there exists a stationary Bayesian–Markov equilibrium in which a player's strategy maps a tuple of the previous type and action profiles and the player's current type to a mixed action. The existence can be extended to K-periodic revelation. I also offer a computational algorithm to find an equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 20734336
- Volume :
- 15
- Issue :
- 5
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Games (20734336)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 180556963
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050031