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Stationary Bayesian–Markov Equilibria in Bayesian Stochastic Games with Periodic Revelation.

Authors :
Ko, Eunmi
Source :
Games (20734336). Oct2024, Vol. 15 Issue 5, p31. 17p.
Publication Year :
2024

Abstract

I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information revelation. In this environment, I show that there exists a stationary Bayesian–Markov equilibrium in which a player's strategy maps a tuple of the previous type and action profiles and the player's current type to a mixed action. The existence can be extended to K-periodic revelation. I also offer a computational algorithm to find an equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
20734336
Volume :
15
Issue :
5
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Games (20734336)
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
180556963
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050031