The Conceivability Challenge for Essentialism in the Epistemology of Modality.

Mental operation accounts in the epistemology of modality, such as conceivabilitybased theories, seek to explain modal knowledge in terms of our capacity to execute a mental operation, such as conceiving. One criticism of mental operation accounts is that without constraints we can, for example, conceive of all sorts of scenarios, and thus absent constraints, mental operations are unreliable as a guide to possibility. Essentialist accounts in the epistemology of modality aim to solve the reliability problem by using constraints set by the essences of entities. They seek to explain knowledge of possibility and necessity via knowledge of essence. Given the structure of the theory, essentialists face the epistemology of essence question: how do we know the essential properties (or essence) of entities, such that we can derive knowledge of modality from them? Here I raise the conceivability challenge for essentialism in the epistemology of modality: what if knowledge of essence depends on conceivability? I examine E. J. Lowe's and Bob Hale's distinct accounts of essentialism. I argue that given that neither of their views offers a viable answer to the epistemology of essence question, essentialism faces the conceivability challenge. I conclude by considering two ways forward in the epistemology of modality. The revisionary approach takes the deadlock between mental operation accounts and essentialism to signal a need to adopt a more extreme epistemology of modality. The conciliatory approach takes the deadlock between mental operation accounts and essentialism to signal accepting the interlocking and mutually supporting epistemic relationship between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]