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Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with International Agreements.
- Source :
-
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association . 2002 Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, p1-20. 21p. 1 Diagram, 1 Chart, 2 Graphs. - Publication Year :
- 2002
-
Abstract
- This paper challenges an increasingly common claim about the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Many political scientists argue that, in a democracy, domestic audiences constrain leaders to honor international commitments. I explain why this argument depends on three assumptions that are unlikely to hold in a wide range of cases. I then offer an alternative theory in which domestic audiences sometimes make compliance less rather than more likely, and I test it with a unique collection of public opinion polls about foreign debt in Argentina. The data reveal that domestic audiences prevented Argentina from suspending debt payments in 1999 but had the opposite effect two years later, when they contributed to the largest default in financial history. The results confirm the existence of a conditional, rather than direct, relationship between democratic accountability and compliance, and they suggest an important avenue for future research: investigating who favors default and when they are likely to become electorally decisive. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association
- Publication Type :
- Conference
- Accession number :
- 17985026