Kantian appearances and intentional objects.

This article explores different interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism, with a focus on Anja Jauernig's intentional object interpretation of Kantian appearances. Jauernig argues that intentional objects, which exist only as the contents of mental states, can explain the mind-dependence of appearances without making them purely subjective. The article also delves into the concept of representational content and its role in understanding Kant's account of appearances. The author agrees with Jauernig's distinction between empirically real objects and non-existent intentional objects, but questions how this can be the case if appearances are merely intentional objects. The article concludes by discussing the challenges of reconciling an intentional object view with contingently undiscovered truths and understanding perceptual states that are both intentional and a function of things as they are in themselves. [Extracted from the article]