Back to Search
Start Over
Unity Without Truth? Contra Trueman's Immodest Identity Theory.
- Source :
-
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) . Jul2024, Vol. 124 Issue 2, p197-204. 8p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- Robert Trueman (2022) sets out and defends an 'immodest' identity theory of truth: that is, an identity theory in which the facts with which true propositions are identical are things whose totality is the world: i.e. obtaining states of affairs. This brief reply argues that Truman's theory falls foul of a perennial objection to such immodest identity theories: namely, that it cannot explain how a candidate proposition's putative elements can be unified into a proposition proper without this proposition being true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *CONCORD
*PERENNIALS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00667374
- Volume :
- 124
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 179110577
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae008