Adherence strategy based on evolutionary games in epidemic spreading.

In light of the dynamic interaction between epidemic spreading and behavior responses, the development of a comprehensive epidemic model is both crucial and challenging. In this paper, based on the evolutionary game theory, we investigate the co-evolution of adherence strategy decision-making and epidemic spreading, with a particular focus on the role of conformity. Considering individual self-determination and population imitation, we analyze two distinct strategy updating rules: profit-driven decision-making and conformity-driven decision-making. We also account for the influence of neighbors' strategies on epidemic spread rates. Extensive simulations are conducted to analyze epidemic phase transitions and the distribution of infected individuals at the stationary state of the epidemic. By analyzing the adoption of strategies under different scenarios of conformity fractions, we find that conformity widens the disparity between different strategies over time. In conclusion, our results demonstrate that conformity promotes the adherence strategy, which helps reduce the size of the epidemic. • The adherence strategy is analyzed on an evolutionary game-based SIS epidemic model. • Self-determination and imitation are considered in the choice of adherence strategy. • We analyze two strategy updating rules: profit-driven and conformity-driven. • Simulations show that conformity widens the disparity between the two strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]