Evolutionary analysis of participation behavior of shared parking in traditional business district.

This paper explores ways to promote the Shared Parking Business Economy Model (SPBEM) in traditional business districts (TBD) to mitigate their declining survival. A microscopic four-party evolutionary game model investigates the mechanisms behind the complex interactions among four typical businesses in TBD. Evolutionary stability is also analyzed based on three different scenarios. Secondly, this paper examines the limited rationality of participants and sifts the impact of significant factors on the dynamic evolution process by using the cumulative prospect theory and the quantitative equation of the conformity effect. The paper validates the game model and main conclusions through realistic scenarios and numerical simulations. Finally, the four main types of parameters are extensively discussed. The findings suggest that the implementation of SPBEM could enhance the economic development of TBD. Furthermore, successful promotion of SPBEM in TBD demands coordinated efforts from the four types of businesses. Initial participation probability, proportion of parking slots, historical average customer flow, and cooperation revenue all positively influence participation behavior; and promoting SPBEM in TBD requires coordination between the four business types. These findings serve as valuable references for TBD managers and operators in their decision-making processes. • An economic model of shared parking is presented. • The mechanism of the quadratic evolutionary game in traditional business districts is discussed. • Four factors influencing the participation decisions of merchants are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]