Bilimlerin Birliği ya da Bölünmüşlüğü Düşüncesi: Fodor ve Dupre Örneği.

The debate over the unity or division of sciences is a significant topic in the history and philosophy of science. From ancient philosophers to today, scientists have attempted to unify, classify, or segment the sciences. Greek philosophers approached this issue through the concepts of “One” and “Many.” For instance, Parmenides focused on static substances, whereas Heraclitus emphasized becoming and flux. Empedocles pointed to the four elements, Democritus to atoms, Pythagoras to numbers, Plato to forms, and Aristotle to categories. In the Islamic world, Ibn Khaldun expanded the unity of sciences through social sciences, while Avicenna classified sciences based on practical and universal aspects. With the return to nature in the 16th century, sciences were reshaped through natural sciences. F. Bacon emphasized the importance of experiment and observation, categorizing sciences in a pyramid. Galileo proposed that nature is structured on mathematical symbols, while Descartes and Leibniz developed their scientific views based on Newtonian physics. Kant evaluated sciences not by searching behind phenomena but as a cognitive unity based on principles.In the modern era, positivism gained prominence. Since the 19th century, thinkers of the Vienna Circle advocated for the unity of sciences, reducing all epistemic activities to positive science. These thinkers envisaged scientific philosophy grounded in physical science. Reductionism was considered the most important method for achieving the unity of sciences. This paper will critique Fodor’s physicalism based on reductionism and defend Dupre’s idea of the disunity of sciences. Dupre argues that the reductionist method cannot be applied to special sciences like biology and that, although occasionally interacting, sciences should be considered independent modes of knowledge with their specific domains and methods. The paper will begin by presenting the historical development of the unity of sciences within the context of the philosophy of science, focusing on the views of the Vienna Circle philosophers. It will examine the thoughts of neo-positivist philosophers such as Carnap (1928, 1934) and Nagel (1961) on the unity of sciences, Hempel’s nomological-deductive explanation model (1965), and the claims of Oppenheim/Putnam (1958) regarding the unity of sciences. Subsequently, Fodor’s views on the unity of sciences will be evaluated, and physicalism based on reductionism will be analysed. After discussing the shortcomings and errors of this view, Dupre’s argument for the disunity of sciences will be examined, particularly highlighting the inapplicability of reductionism in special sciences like biology. Ultimately, it will be argued that, rather than achieving a unified science reduced to physical laws, the contemporary understanding of science is better served by recognizing the distinct and autonomous nature of different scientific fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]