New land reserve institution and changing entrepreneurial urban governance in China.

Existing studies suggest that land financing has given rise to entrepreneurial governance in China because local governments act like entrepreneurs to capture land value appreciation. However, the new land reserve institution has recently forbidden local governments from using land as collateral and centralized the financial management of land reserve projects. Given this profound change in land institutions, we ask whether local governments have become less entrepreneurial. This paper investigates the Shanghai Land Reserve Centre. The funding restriction and declining land profitability make it more challenging to generate land revenue. However, the local government is now adapting to the new land reserve institution, developing new entrepreneurial tactics, and treating land investment as a recurrent income stream. Facing the conjuncture of alarming local government debts, re-centralizing state control, and structural limits of land finance, local governments' entrepreneurial stance is not eliminated, but their entrepreneurial practices are reshaped. Theoretically, this paper contributes to understanding how urban entrepreneurialism evolves in response to changing political and economic conjunctures. • A framework for understanding governance transformation: conjunctures-incentives-tactics. • The new land reserve institution transforms local land-based entrepreneurial tactics. • Declining profitability of land finance based on project-level dataset in Shanghai. • Land incentive is reshaped to use land to trigger a long-term investment stream. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]