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Defending (perceptual) attitudes.
- Source :
-
European Journal of Philosophy . Jun2024, Vol. 32 Issue 2, p560-576. 17p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations behind the rejection of the attitude component can be accommodated within the tripartite framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *METAPHYSICS
*PHILOSOPHY
*IMAGINATION
*ATTITUDE (Psychology)
*VALUES (Ethics)
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09668373
- Volume :
- 32
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 177946814
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12933