Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of enterprise's green technology innovation under green credit policy: evidence from China.

With China's commitment to achieving a carbon peak and carbon neutralisation by 2030 and 2060, respectively, the government's requirements for enterprises to adopt green technology are becoming increasingly urgent. We established a tripartite evolutionary game model of an enterprise, government and bank. We analysed conditions for the existence of stable points and factors affecting the choice of stakeholder's strategy. The influence of the change in each parameter on the evolutionary stable strategy was further studied. We found that the government's reward, subsidy and taxes for enterprise's green technology innovation can increase the willingness of enterprises to implement green technology innovation, and the role of taxes is greater than that of subsidies. The preferential interest rate for green innovation is conducive to stimulating enterprises to engage in green innovation, but the increase in the cost of green credit will reduce the willingness of banks to provide green credit. With the increase in the subsidy, incentives and the cost of environmental regulation, the policy burden of the government will gradually increase, thus reducing the willingness of the government to implement environmental regulation policy. The research presented in this paper furthers work on the theoretical modelling of green credit and environmental regulation policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]