Politically connected firms and access to credit: Evidence from India.

This paper explores the role of political connections in facilitating access to credit for firms in the Indian corporate sector. This study aims to address gaps in the literature by combining theoretical insights with empirical data. Our model proposes that political connections may reduce risk for firms, thereby enhancing their access to credit. Utilizing a unique dataset of S&P BSE 500 companies from 2001 to 2019, we analyze the extent of these connections and their impact on financial leverage and debt-to-asset ratios. Our findings reveal that politically connected firms, defined by their monetary donations to political parties and the inclusion of Members of Parliament on their boards, exhibit significantly higher financial leverage and debt-to-asset ratios than unconnected firms. This implies a lower perceived borrower's risk and an advantageous position in accessing credit, likely a result of their political ties. The implications of our findings extend to the realms of corporate governance, economic policy, and the broader understanding of emerging market dynamics. • Political connections, as part of non-market strategies of firms, may be crucial in accessing credit. • Our theoretical framework highlights role of risk and donation to political party by a firm in accessing credit. • This study constructs a novel dataset of political connections of Indian companies. • Political connections lead to more favorable borrowing-related outcomes of companies such as, financial leverage and debt-assets ratio. • Political connections specific to a particular political party tend to serve companies more (in terms of the aforementioned outcomes), when that particular party is in power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]