ویتگنشتاین کریپکی و قابلیت گرایی تقلیل گرایانه هانا گینزبرگ.

Kripke in his famous book on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy argues, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that there can be no fact of the matter as to what a speaker means by her words, that is, no fact that can meet the Constitution Demand and the Normativity Demand. He particularly argues against the dispositional view, according to which meaning facts are constituted by facts about the speaker’s dispositions to respond in a certain way on certain occasions. He argues that facts about dispositions are finite and are incapable of constituting facts about what speakers mean by their words; they are also essentially descriptive, not prescriptive and, thus, cannot meet the Normativity Demand. Hannah Ginsborg has recently attempted to resist Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s arguments against dispositionalism by defending a new sort of reductive dispositionalism which can meet both demands at the same time. In this paper, I will argue that she would not be successful in her project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]