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Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts †.
- Source :
-
Games (20734336) . Apr2024, Vol. 15 Issue 2, p11. 38p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies. I find that the coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. I also find that the pattern of contracts is monotonic with respect to the type distributions of principals and agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *EXCLUSIVE contracts
*AGENCY (Law)
*CONTRACTS
*BARGAINING power
*CONTRACT theory
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 20734336
- Volume :
- 15
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Games (20734336)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 176879947
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020011