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Proximal intentions intentionalism.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Apr2024, Vol. 181 Issue 4, p879-891. 13p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- According to a family of metasemantics for demonstratives called intentionalism, the intentions of speakers determine the reference of demonstratives. And according to a sub-family I call proximal intentions (PI) intentionalism, the intention that determines reference is one that occupies a certain place—the proximal one—in a structure of intentions. PI intentionalism is thought to make correct predictions about reference where less sophisticated forms of intentionalism make the wrong predictions. In this article I argue that this is an illusion: PI intentionalism also suffers from predictive inadequacy. In Sect. 1, I present the problem of predictive inadequacy for intentionalism and an ad hoc response to it. In Sect. 2, I sketch a version of PI intentionalism that aims to provide the most principled response to this problem. In Sect. 3, I explain why PI intentionalism cannot solve the problem after all. In Sect. 4, I indicate where I think metasemanticists should go next. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 181
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 176582948
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02118-6