Nuclear security policy challenges and strategies in the Serpong nuclear area: A regulatory review.

The development of the current situation and condition of offices in the area of the Center for Science and Technology Research (PUSPIPTEK) in Serpong has changed with the merger of 4 (four) government research institutions initially, then later added with other Ministries/Institutions (K/L). Likewise, personnel/employees from Ministries/Institutions who served as functional researchers are transferred to a new government agency for research and innovation, namely the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) and they work in one area PUSPIPTEK, Serpong, so that many personnel/staff in and out of PUSPIPTEK area. As it is known that in the PUSPIPTEK area which is a strategic area of vital objects there is a nuclear area in which nuclear installations/facilities already exist and operate such as nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, radioactive waste installations and others, will be a potential security threat to nuclear facilities/installations. The Licensee are required to pay increased attention to ensuring adequate nuclear security in nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities, in addition to paying attention to safety. To anticipate threats that could harm nuclear installations/facilities in the form of theft, and/or unauthorized transfer or sabotage of nuclear materials, it is necessary to establish and to implement a physical protection system. This implementation is a form of real role to take preventive action against possible threats in the Serpong Nuclear Area (KNS) which must be carried out by the licensee as stated in Government Regulation Number 54 Year 2012 on Safety and Security for Nuclear Installations. In this paper, the presentation uses a qualitative descriptive method through literature studies and studies on the suitability of nuclear security/physical protection regulations. Then, from the results of the description of the conformity study of these regulations, it can be recommended a policy strategy related to physical protection and the basic threats to design level facilities in the KNS. The limitations of this paper only describe the KNS locus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]