Back to Search
Start Over
A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: affect as feeling towards value.
- Source :
-
Inquiry . Jan2024, Vol. 67 Issue 1, p1-24. 24p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *EMOTIONAL experience
*EMOTIONS
*AFFECT (Psychology)
*ATTITUDE (Psychology)
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 0020174X
- Volume :
- 67
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Inquiry
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 174204564
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341