Influences of information sharing and online recommendations in a supply chain: reselling versus agency selling.

This paper investigates the effects of reselling and agency contracts on the platform's incentive to share information under two scenarios, i.e., the recommendation scenario and non-recommendation scenario. Through analyzing the equilibrium solutions, we derive the following results. First, comparing the recommendation and non-recommendation scenarios, the platform prefers the recommendation scenario under the reselling contract. However, contrary to traditional wisdom, when the recommendation efficiency is relatively more efficient, the platform chooses the non-recommendation scenario in the agency contract; as the recommendation efficiency becomes less efficient, the recommendation scenario is preferred in the agency contract. Second, for the reselling contract, the platform prefers to withhold demand information in the recommendation and non-recommendation scenarios. However, the platform voluntarily shares this information under the agency contract for the two scenarios. Third, the platform's optimal strategy depends on the commission rate, the platform's recommendation efficiency, and the level of information accuracy. Intuitively, a lower commission rate induces the platform to prefer the reselling contract in the recommendation and non-recommendation scenarios. However, a higher commission rate does not always make the platform choose the agency contract. The recommendation efficiency and the level of information accuracy affect the platform's optimal strategy. Furthermore, given the platform's optimal strategy, there are Pareto optimal regions that make the manufacturer better off. That is, the platform and the manufacturer achieve a win–win situation. Finally, in an extension of the model, this paper shows the platform's optimal strategy when a hybrid contract is used, which also demonstrates the robustness of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]