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Fairness for multi-self agents.
- Source :
-
Games & Economic Behavior . Sep2023, Vol. 141, p321-336. 16p. - Publication Year :
- 2023
-
Abstract
- Are fairness and efficiency compatible in behavioral welfare economics? Assuming multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their various objectives into complete and transitive rankings, we call an allocation unambiguously-fair if it fair according to every self of every agent. We show that efficiency is generically compatible with the unambiguous fair-share guarantee, and — in two agent economies — with unambiguous no-envy. But in some larger economies, no efficient allocation satisfies unambiguous no-envy or unambiguous egalitarian equivalence. These non-existence results persist if the agents integrate their objectives into complete but intransitive rankings. Even if unambiguously envy-free Pareto optima exist, they may not arise as market equilibria from equal endowments. Finally, we show that there are Pareto optima with the unambiguous fair-share guarantee that are envy-free for at least one complete and transitive aggregation of the agents' preferences, and others that are egalitarian-equivalent according to at least one such aggregation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 08998256
- Volume :
- 141
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Games & Economic Behavior
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 170011735
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.004