Sesgo político en la distribución de recursos durante la pandemia en Chile: evidencia para un país centralizado.

This research analyzes the political influence on the distribution of current transfers from the central level to municipalities during the first wave of the pandemic. From a panel data and fixed effects analysis, we are able to identify an electoral bias in the distribution of resources. Municipalities where the mayor and the president are from the same political party, received on average 61% more transfers, being higher as the margin of victory increases. The distribution of resources during the pandemic followed strategic criteria to favor the interests of the national government, which highlights the importance of strengthening the municipal financing system and, specifically, the resources that the central government can transfer discretionally, introducing transparent criteria that contribute to reduce territorial inequality gaps. In this sense, the recommendation is to use transfers based on formulas with statistical indicators related to the objectives of the transfer. The indicators should not be susceptible to manipulation and should be easily verifiable. The formulas should be maintained for several years and be subject to review and adaptation, preferably based on an analysis of their impact on the objectives of the transfers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]