DAMN THE TORPEDOES! AN UNPRINCIPLED, INCORRECT, AND LONELY APPROACH TO COMPASSIONATE RELEASE.

When Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, it extended to federal prisoners the right to file their own motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As COVID-19 ravaged prisons, sentencing courts received a massive influx of prisoner-filed compassionate-release motions. But because the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the relevant Application Note predated the First Step Act, and therefore made no mention of prisoner-filed compassionate-release motions, sentencing courts were unsure whether they had discretion to determine whether a prisoner presented "extraordinary and compelling circumstances" warranting compassionate release. Every United States Court of Appeals to consider whether sentencing courts had discretion in evaluating prisoner-filed compassionate-release motions agreed they did. All but one. In United States v. Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly interpreted the First Step Act, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the Application Note. Today, two Americas exist. Federal prisoners in forty-seven states may request compassionate release, and sentencing courts have the discretion to determine whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant relief. Federal prisoners in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia may also request compassionate release, but the Bureau of Prisons, not sentencing courts, determines which reasons outside those enumerated in the Application Note are extraordinary and compelling. This Article examines compassionate release's history, critiques the Eleventh Circuit's Bryant opinion, and proposes three avenues to return discretion to sentencing judges: the Sentencing Commission could amend the Application Note, Congress could legislate, and a prisoner could seek en banc review in the Eleventh Circuit challenging Bryant as wrongly decided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]