Systemic Corruption as an Intervening Variable in Post-Communist Transitions.

Scholars of post-Soviet transitions often consider corruption to be an outcome or expression of something that went wrong in the transitional process. In my paper, I argue that corruption should instead be put squarely at the center of analysis. Sovietologists were long aware that extensive networks of corruption had permeated the Soviet state and party structure. In my research that I conducted from 1998 ? 1999 in Georgia and 2003 in Armenia, I found that these informal institutions of corruption have largely survived the rapid changes of the early 1990s. Similar to Soviet times, they currently coexist with the formal political and economic institutions, emasculating the latter to a significant degree. By undermining political and economic competition, as well as accountability and thereby the rule of law, corrupt institutions contribute to massive violations of citizens? rights and strangle the economies of most Soviet successor states. The extent of damage done by corrupt institutions, however, depends to a significant degree on the amount of control that the central government exerts over the corrupt system. Control, in turn, is a function of the mode of post-Soviet transition. In sum, corruption is an important intervening variable between the form of transition and the transitional outcome. Either way, the cementation of corrupt networks makes the arrival of ?fresh? leaders extremely unlikely and/or undermines the political reach of new leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]