Decentralization, Electoral Competition, and Performance of Local Governments in Mexico.

This paper analyzes the influence of electoral competition, party alternation, and voter turnout on the performance of local governments in Mexico. Using data for virtually all municipalities in the country, I investigate whether these political factors have any role in improving the levels of coverage for water, drainage, and electricity, between 1990 and 2000. I find that electoral competition has a modest influence on the growth of drainage coverage, but plays no role in the other two services. The alternation of parties is irrelevant in explaining service provision. However, voter turnout consistently emerges as a meaningful factor, which supports the proposition that policymakers are more likely to expand the provision of public goods when citizens are more active in the electoral arena. The paper suggests that competition might be better viewed as an influence on the spending choices of higher intergovernmental levels, rather than on local decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]