The Evolution of DemocraticConsolidation.

This paper is the first in a series of papers that investigate whether certain patterns of elite interaction reinforce or undermine democracy. In this paper, we compare actors bargaining across series of crises in stable democracies and new democracies. Do actors learn to cooperate across time, as the crisis unfolds? How can elite interaction lead to crisis resolution and a stronger democracy? We began our investigation by focusing on elite behavior in four countries: two stable democracies (Italy and India) and two countries that successfully transition from autocracy to democracy (Mali and Portugal). In particular, we followed actors bargaining during crises where the government has incomplete information and the opposition is working to change the political system from within, rather than trying to overthrow it. We found that crises are more likely to be resolved if the government shows its willingness to negotiate with the opposition, in two ways. First, the crisis is more likely to be resolved to the extent that the government makes a non-zero offer to its opponent. Any concession, no matter how small, shows the opposition that the government is willing to enter into negotiations. Second, the government learns with which type of opponent it is negotiating, based on whether the opposition accepts or rejects its offer. If the government?s offer is rejected, the crisis is more likely to be resolved if the government counters by increasing its offer, even by a small amount. Again, this action shows the opposition that the government is willing to continue to negotiate. In future papers, we will expand our research from four to twelve countries. First, this widening of the sample will allow us to compare across five types of countries: stable democracies, cases that experience a transition to democracy, unstable countries, cases that experience a transition to autocracy, and stable autocracies. Second, we will compare actors bargaining during crises not only within the system, where elites are demanding reforms, but also crises against the system, where the opposition is trying to overthrow the government. The final paper in this series will give us a fuller understanding to how elite interaction can reinforce or undermine democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]