Knowing When to Be An Honest Broker: Impartiality and Third-Party Support for Peace Implementation After Civil Wars.

Rationalist bargaining theory suggests that commitment problems often play a central role in both the outbreak and the perpetuation of violent conflict. Empirical studies indicate that commitment problems are especially pervasive in intrastate disputes, where war termination requires combatants to demobilize or disarm, leaving them highly vulnerable to unilateral defection by the opponent. Ending civil wars therefore often requires the involvement of third parties who help disputants overcome their fears of exploitation through outside monitoring and enforcement. Although this argument has come to be widely accepted, disagreement exists as to whether third parties need to be impartial to serve this function. Whereas some scholars believe that interveners must play the role of an "honest broker"; to succeed, others maintain that because of their greater willingness to commit resources, biased interveners make better guarantors. This paper suggests that these seemingly contradictory views can be reconciled with the help of two additional variables. Specifically, I argue that whether impartiality enhances or undermines the effectiveness of interventions aimed at resolving problems of credible commitment depends on (1) whether the intervener pursues an informational or enforcement strategy and (2) the type of commitment problem that the intervener seeks to address. The empirical part of the paper tests this argument against seventeen cases of third-party intervention aimed at supporting the implementation of negotiated civil war settlements. The results of this test provide substantial support for the hypotheses presented in the theoretical section of the paper, but also indicate that greater attention needs to be paid to the role of selection effects in shaping the relationship between impartiality and intervention outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]