Government Change inPresident-Parliamentary Regimes: The Case of Russia 1994-2003.

This paper examines the causes of government change in Russia’s President-Parliamentary regime (1994-2003) and assesses three theoretical perspectives: 1) The view that the constitutional format of President-Parliamentary regimes causes government instability and conflict. 2) The proposition that Russia’s constitution creates such a powerful presidency that the incumbent can decide government changes unchecked. 3) The view that government change is the result of an institutionally structured bargaining process, in which the capability and willingness of actors to use their constitutional powers is shaped by election results, policy and public opinion shocks and government performance. The paper analyses opinion poll, economic and election data, the memoir literature, press reports and current event almanacs. This evidence suggests: 1) That the regime type perspective correctly identifies a tendency toward government instability in Russia’s president-parliamentary regime, but that it can neither account for the mechanisms of government change nor for variation in conflict and co-operation between president and assembly. 2) That the president was influential in many instances, but that major government changes had to be negotiated with the Duma, and that the president was not always able to secure his desired outcomes. 3) That government change in Russia appeared to be best understood as the outcome of an institutionally structured bargaining process, in which actors are influenced by election outcomes, public opinion and policy shocks and government performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]