’The German Way’ -- Germany’s policy in the Iraq Crisis and the Question of Continuity and Change in German Foreign Policy.

For many observers, Germany’s policy in the Iraq crisis marks an unexpected deviation from its foreign policy tradition. Recent research on German foreign policy stresses that both before and after unification, German foreign policy has been guided by three characteristics: caution in the use of military force (antimilitarism); support for the strengthening of international institutions including the readiness to significantly integrate itself in these institutions (multilateralism); and a mastery in maintaining close ties to both France and the U.S.. To explain this foreign policy continuity, many observers have pointed to a stable political culture and an internalized German foreign policy identity. From this perspective, even if one interprets Germany’s policy in the Iraq crisis as an instance of antimilitarist multilateralism, it appears puzzling why the German government took a stand against the U.S. and why it stressed its position would not be affected by a Security Council decision. This paper argues that Germany’s Iraq policy is much more in line with recent developments of German foreign policy than the existing literature would make us believe. By analyzing key aspects of the foreign-policy discourse with methods of qualitative content analysis, I show that especially the German discourse on multilateralism has not been marked by continuity. Instead, while German foreign-policy makers have continued to support multilateralism, a different understanding of multilateralism has evolved. It combines traditional elements of furthering international norms and values with new elements of asserting national interests in international fora. It embraces the open formulation of national interests and the privileging of short-term individual benefits over the longer-term securement of cooperative relations with key partners. The paper shows that with this development in mind, it becomes clear that Germany’s policy in the Iraq crisis is an outgrowth of a changing political discourse rather than a deviation from foreign-policy continuity. I conclude by discussing the implications of this finding for both the further development of German foreign policy and the academic study of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]