Why Reichenbach wasn't entirely wrong, and Poincaré was almost right, about geometric conventionalism.

The present paper revisits conventionalism about the geometry of classical and relativistic spacetimes. By means of critically examining a recent evaluation of conventionalism, we clarify key themes of, and rectify common misunderstandings about, conventionalism. Reichenbach's variant is demarcated from conventionalism simpliciter, associated primarily with Poincaré. We carefully outline the latter's core tenets—as a selective anti-realist response to a particular form of theory underdetermination. A subsequent double defence of geometric conventionalism is proffered: one line of defence employs (and thereby, to some extent, rehabilitates) a plausible reading of Reichenbach's idea of universal forces; another consists in independent support for conventionalism, unrelated to Reichenbach. Conventionalism, we maintain, remains a live option in contemporary philosophy of spacetime physics, worthy of serious consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]