Ethnic Nationalist Politics or Rational Choices?: Making Sense of Coalition Alliances Among Burma?s Armies and Political Opposition Groups.

The half-century Burmese/Myanmar Civil War is likely the world?s longest-running violent conflict. It has left much of the country devastated, the majority of the people destitute, and turned a resource-rich and strategically located nation into a pariah state. Over thirty insurgent groups have fought the central Burman-dominated government for the right to secede, for autonomy, and/or a share of power. As in many internal conflicts, rebel armies within Burma have traditionally formed along ethnic lines, reflecting the country?s significant national diversity and complexity. Yet, contrary to popular perception, these groups have not been fighting alone. Instead, they have exhibited alliance-building behavior in three distinct shifts: coalition development, 1960-76; democratization and ethnic-group consolidation, 1988-92; and alternative-governance development, 1998-present. This paper seeks to explain why three key ethnic minority resistance groups within Burma?the Karen, Shan, and Wa?have joined various coalition alliances over the past 15 years with other ethnic minority groups, pro-democracy Burmans, and groups outside Burma. The paper provides an overview of three theories being applied to this case, a synopsis of Burma?s ethnic and political history so as to contextualize the conflict, an analysis of alliance formation within Burma, and an examination of the political and military strategies of the Shan, Wa and Karen. The three theories, all rooted in rational choice, are: Russell Hardin?s Collective Action as Self-Interest Theory, which examines the compound motives behind identity and group formation; Fearson and Laitin?s Cooperation Equilibrium Theory, which hypothesizes that security dilemmas can be minimized through spiral and in-group policing equilibriums; and Charles King?s Benefits of War Theory, which credits material and power incentives for creating an equilibrium of war that extends conflicts to the point of intractability. Two of these, Hardin?s and King?s, provide explanatory power for understanding coalition formation by ethnic insurgency groups and the entrenchment of internal conflicts. It is difficult to say if the practical experience that the coalitions and individual ethnic groups are gaining by adopting democratic norms and institutions will make state building easier or more difficult, if and when the Burmese junta relinquishes power. They certainly will have more experience with democratic ideals and institutions, as well as more knowledge about each other. Yet, it also may be true, as King implies, that these groups will have entrenched interests and positions that make melding multiple administrations and governance types troublesome at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]