Breaking the Chain or Flexible Governance? Cabinets in Semi-Presidential Democracies.

This paper focuses on the impact of semi-presidential regimes on governance, delegation and accountability by examining under which conditions presidents take over from assemblies in these regimes, and form presidentially chosen technical cabinets. One interpretation is that these episodes of presidential governance illustrate the agency risks inherent in semi-presidentialism: delegation to two electoral agents creates tensions, which presidents may in the worst-case scenario resolve by marginalizing the assembly. A second interpretation is that these technical cabinets illustrate the flexibility of semi-presidential regimes in generating a wide variety of governance solutions, from president-led to fully assembly based cabinets. Alternatively, the formation of technical cabinets may reflect the staying power of initial historical choices, and the path dependence of politicians? subsequent decisions. This paper offers the first empirical assessment of the conditions under which presidents take control over governments and the implications which this has for governance, delegation and accountability in what has recently become Europe?s most commonly chosen regime type. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]