Initiation Versus Implementation: Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s.

Argentina’s 1994 judicial reforms fit a pattern that characterized the Latin American experience with such reform in the 1990s. In Argentina, as in many Latin American countries, the ruling party could be induced to initiate judicial reforms (introduce constitutional revisions to strengthen the judiciary) but then proved unwilling to implement these constitutional changes (via the enactment of congressional legislation). As a result, institutional judicial advancements often remained purely paper changes. In the Argentine case, the ruling party delayed the implementation of judicial reform until it believed it was unlikely to maintain its position of political dominance. Judicial reform in such a situation may serve the ruling party as an "insurance policy" in which a stronger judicial branch reduces the risks the ruling party faces should it become the opposition. An empowered judiciary may check the capacity of incoming politicians to alter the outgoing party’s policies or to change the rules of the game in ways that would prevent the outgoing ruling party from returning to power in the future. My research suggests that the likelihood of effective judicial reform increases as the ruling party’s probability of reelection declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]