Government Party Discipline in Parliamentary Democracies: the Cases of Belgium, France, and the Unit.

In recent years the level of unity in parliamentary parties has continued to increase. Whereas in Congress the party leadership’s capabilities to solve collective action problems and to reduce transaction costs have been in doubt, in parliamentary systems little seems to warrant such doubt. Therefore, the paper’s aim is to trace the party leadership’s particular capabilities to secure party unity in parliamentary systems by means of 1. contract design, 2. screening and selection, 3. monitoring and information requirements, and 4. institutional checks. To the extent that these capabilities affect members differently, it is possible to sketch their contours on the basis of who the rebels are. It is apparent that discipline is not readily explained in terms of rewards and punishments. Factions and tendencies provide perhaps the most valid prediction for dissent in France and the United Kingdom, whereas in Belgium the extra-parliamentary party leadership and a detailed policy agreement have a strong impact on members’ discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]